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I. NEW LEGISLATION
Four significant amendments to Florida's corporate code were
adopted at the 1967 session of the Florida Legislature. First, both filing
fees and taxes on corporations for profit were increased.' Second, with
respect to mergers and consolidations of domestic and foreign corporations, payment for shares in new or constituent corporations may now be
made with "other property or assets" of the consolidated or merged
corporation. 2 This was a needed addition, for the media of payment was
formerly limited to "cash, bonds, notes or stock." Third, section 608.55,
which voids certain transfers by a corporation when it is insolvent or its
insolvency is imminent, has been amended to make it clear that such
transfers are not void if made for a valuable consideration to a person
who has "no notice or reasonable cause to believe" that such a transfer
would effect a preference.' Finally, section 608.59, which prohibits unincorporated persons from operating a business for profit under trade names
or styles which suggest incorporation unless accompanied by the words
"not incorporated," has been amended to include within the prohibition
the word "Incorporated" and its abbreviation "Inc."
* Professor of Law, University of Miami.
The assistance of Mr. Alan E. Weinstein in the preparation of this article is gratefully
acknowledged. Mr. Weinstein is a member of the Law Review and a Student Instructor in
Research & Writing.
1. FLA. STAT. § 608.05(2) (a) (1967) was amended to increase filing fees from $5.00 to
$10.00. FLA. STAT. § 608.052 (2) (b) (1967) was amended to increase the fee for certified copies
of corporate documents from $3.00 to $5.00. Similarly, with the exception of corporations
organized with no par value stock, filing taxes have been increased. See FLA. STAT. § 608.05 (3)
(4) (1967), under which the minimum filing tax is now $20.00. Companion amendments
effected increases in filing fees for domestic and foreign non-profit corporations. FLA. STAT.
§ 617.015, 617.11 (1967). Fees for profit corporations for filing a certificate designating a place
for service of process have been increased from $1.00 to $2.00. FLA. STAT. § 47.36 (1967).
See also FLA. STAT. § 47.42 (1967), which has been amended to increase fees for furnishing
information contained in certificates filed under FLA. STAT. § § 47.34 and 47.36 (1967) to
$3.00.
2. FLA. STAT. § § 608.20(1) and 608.21(1) (1967).
3. The former FLA. STAT. § 608.55 (1965) did except transfers "in the hands of a
purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice."
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Certain other statutory changes affecting corporations are also
worthy of note. Among them is a 1967 amendment to the section governing political contributions. 4 Formerly, that section prohibited political
contributions by corporations. The amendment permits corporations to
"do any act or thing that an individual may do." Inasmuch as individuals,
with certain exceptions, may make maximum political contributions of
1,000 dollars, presumably certain corporations are now also free to con5
tribute that amount.

Part II of the corporate code, enacted in 1963, deals with close
corporations.' A pertinent section of this legislation provides that corporate existence is not impaired by the acquisition of all the shares of
stock by one or two persons. Furthermore, such a one or two man corporation possesses the "managerial boards or bodies or any capacities,
powers or authority which it would have possessed with three or more
stockholders."' But another section provided that the articles of incorporation of such a close corporation could provide for management by
"not less than three stockholders." Read together, these two sections were
paradoxical. Presumably, the 1967 amendment eliminating the above language was intended to cure this defect.8
Section 865.09(2) provides that persons engaging in business under
a fictitious name must register that name with the clerk of the circuit
court of the county where the principal place of business is located.9 But
the statute formerly excepted corporations from its purview. In 1967
the statute was amended to remove this exception. Does this mean that
all corporations must register? Presumably not. It has always been the
writer's view that, even before the amendment, a corporation operating
a business under a name other than its corporate name was required to
register under the fictitious name statute. Three opinions of the Attorney
General also take that position. 10 On the other hand, it is the writer's view
that even after the amendment a corporation operating a business in its
corporate name is not required to register. The purpose of the fictitious
name law is to put persons on notice. However, filing the articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State constitutes public notice. What,
then, was the reason for the amendment? Presumably, it was to clear up
4.

FLA. STAT. §

104.091 (1967).

5.See FLA. STAT. § 99.161(2) (a) (1967). The exceptions are contained in FLA.

STAT.

§ 99.161(1) (1967).
6. For a discussion of this legislation, see Dickson, The Florida Close Corporation Act:
An Experiment That Failed, 21 U. MiAMi L. REv. 842 (1967).
7. FLA. STAT. § 608.0101 (1967).
8. FLA. STAT. § 608.0102 (1967).
9. See FLA. STAT. § 865.09 (1967), under which advertisement of intention to register and
publication are conditions precedent to operation.
10. See 50 FLA. AT'y GEN. OP. 379 (1950) and 51 FLA. AT'y GEN. OP. 472 (1951);
see also, 68 FLA. ATT'Y GEN. Op. 2 (1968) which again reiterates and affirms this position.
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existing confusion on the matter by codifying the aforementioned opinions
of the Attorney General."
Two proposed pieces of legislation which should have been enacted
were not adopted by the legislature. A bill introduced in the Florida Senate would have permitted incorporation by less than three persons. 2
In view of the common practice of the incorporating attorney who uses
himself and two nominees as incorporators with subsequent assignments
to one or two real parties in interest, it seems only a little short of absurd
to insist on three incorporators.
The other needed piece of legislation would have permitted the
merger or consolidation of Florida corporations with corporations of
other countries.' 4 As the law now stands, Florida corporations may consolidate or merge with corporations "organized under the laws of any
other state, territory, possession or jurisdiction of the United States .... .""
Presumably, then, a Florida corporation does not have the power to
merge with a corporation in the Republic of Panama or even with one
in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. In view of the extensive amount
of Latin American business transacted by Florida corporations, legislation permitting such business combinations should be enacted. Of course,
it is arguable that if the surviving corporation is a corporation of another
country, the Florida courts would lose jurisdiction, a development which
might jeopardize the rights of shareholders. But the aforementioned bill
provided for this contingency: "[I]n the case of a merger or consolidation
with a corporation or corporations of any other country which is neither
a territory nor a possession of the United States nor under the jurisdiction
of the United States the resulting entity shall be a Florida corporation."'"
11. In response to an inquiry by the author on this point, the most recent opinion of the
Attorney General substantiated the author's belief by answering the following question in
the negative:
Must a corporation doing business in the name under which it was incorporated and
licensed to do business register under the provisions of the fictitious name act as
amended by chapter 67-209? 68 FLA. ATr'Y GEN. Op. 2 (1968).
12. Fla. S. 1499, 41st Sess. (1967).
13. Paul Carrington, one of the draftsmen of the Texas Business Corporation Act, was
asked this question in a panel discussion: "Why didn't Texas permit one man to incorporate
like Wisconsin?" Mr. Carrington's answer:
We debated it and personally I would say that from the standpoint of corporate law
I don't see any real objection why we could not permit it. We decided that it was
an innovation that had not been tested, that the general historical idea of having
at least three people was pretty well embedded in everyone's minds. Panel on Arkansas Law, 10 ARK. L. REV. 46, 47 (1956).
14. Fla. S. 1490, 41st Sess. (1967).
15. FLA. STAT. § 608.21(1) (1967).
16. Under FLA. STAT. § 613.07 (1967), a "Foreign corporation is defined as: A corporation organized under the laws of any other state or territory or of any other country."
[Italics added]. FLA. STAT. § 613.02 (1967) grants to foreign corporations authorized to do
business in Florida the "same rights, powers and privileges" as Florida corporations. Reading these two sections together, it is arguable that a Florida corporation may consolidate or
merge with a non-U.S. corporation under existing legislation. -But in view of FLA. STAT.
§ 608.21 (1967) the argument is of doubtful validity. See also FLA. STAT. § 608.13(8)(b)
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The bills will be reintroduced and, hopefully, enacted at future legislative sessions.
II. RECENT DECISIONS
A. CorporateFormation
In two cases the Florida Bar sought and obtained injunctions against
individuals who had formed corporations and prepared corporate documents but who were not members of the Florida Bar. In the first of these
cases l7 the Supreme Court of Florida decided that the preparation of
certificates of incorporation and related documents constituted the practice of law. Respondent, an accountant, had charged a fee for such services and had advertised in newspapers that he was a specialist in the
incorporation of businesses. In the second case,'18 respondent, a business
consultant, formed two corporations for friends and for his own family.
No fee was charged for his services. Nevertheless, the court concluded
that neither the absence of compensation nor the close personal relationship validated their actions in forming these corporations.
B. Separate CorporateEntity Privilege
In spite of the fact that there is some defect in the process of incorporating, one who has dealt with the associates as a corporationmay
nevertheless be estopped to deny corporate existence. This situation
arose in a recent Florida case.' 9 In an action by the purchasers for
specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property the court
held that where the vendor knew at the time the agreement was executed
that the purchaser had not filed articles of incorporation" but nevertheless contracted with that purchaser under its corporate name, the vendor
could not validly object that the purchaser had not been duly incorporated.
Numerous cases have arisen where a creditor, finding the corporate treasury empty, seeks to hold the shareholders individually liable.
He asks the court to brush aside the corporate entity, to "pierce the
corporate veil." Frequently the contest arises when one individual owns
all of the shares. But the Florida courts have repeatedly held that the
corporate veil will not be penetrated either at law or in equity unless
it is shown that the corporation was organized or employed to mislead
(1967), granting the power to Florida corporations to "Purchase the corporate assets of
any other corporation . .. ."

17. Florida Bar v. Town, 174 So.2d 395 (Fla. 1965). See also FLA. STAT. § 454.23 (1967).
18. Florida Bar v. Keehley, 190 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1966).
19. 330 Michigan Ave., Inc. v. Cambridge Hotel, Inc., 183 So.2d 725 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
20. "When the articles of incorporation have been filed in the office of the secretary of
state and approved by him and all filing fees and taxes have been paid, the subscribers
thereof, their successors and assigns shall constitute a corporation." FLA. STAT. § 608.04
(1967).
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creditors or to work a fraud upon them. Moreover, the fact that one or
two individuals own all of the stock does not in and of itself spell abuse
of the corporate entity privilege. 21 In this connection, it should be noted
that the courts are far less sympathetic when the plaintiff is a voluntary
contract creditor than when he is an involuntary tort claimant. After
all, unless the corporate situation is misrepresented to him, the creditor
contracts with his eyes open. He could always obtain a personal guarantee
by the shareholders. Accordingly, in a case where D owned ninety-eight
percent of the stock, but where the dealings between that corporation and
P, the creditor, were "entirely corporate" and where no misrepresentation was shown, it is submitted that Judge Barns correctly refused to
pierce the corporate veil and allow P to satisfy his judgment from D's
personal assets. 2 Two other recent Florida cases have reached the same
result on similar reasoning in situations involving liability on corporate
leases.23
C. Pre-IncorporationAgreements
Before the corporation begins its legal existence, the promoter must
perform a variety of necessary services. In short, he must turn an idea
into a tangible reality. The performance of his services usually spells
both expense to the promoter and value to the future corporation. Additionally, such services frequently involve third parties who enter into
contracts with the promoter relative to the enterprise to be organized.
When the corporation comes into existence, the problem of rights and
duties concerning these pre-incorporation arrangements is raised. Frequently the contest takes the form of a suit by the third person against
the promoter or the corporation. The legal stumbling block from the
standpoint of a suit by the third person against the corporation is that
the corporation cannot properly be said to have ratified the promoter's
contract. Ratification implies the existence of a principal (a ratifier)
at the time of the contract, and, of course, the corporation was not in
existence at that time. But courts have overcome this objection under
certain circumstances. The corporation is said to have adopted the contract by expressly or impliedly accepting its benefits with full knowledge.
But knowledge acquired by corporate officers while acting for themselves
and not for the corporation will not be imputed to the corporation. Such
24
was the effect of the holding in a recent Florida case.
21. See, e.g., Advertects, Inc. v. Sawyer Indus., Inc., 84 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1955).
"The acquisition, heretofore or hereafter, of all the shares of stock of a corporation by
one person or by two persons is hereby declared to violate no policy or provision of the laws
of this state." FLA. STAT. § 608.010(2) (1967).
22. Sirmons v. Arnold Lumber Co., 167 So.2d 588 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
23. Soclof v. State Road Dep't, 169 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964) ; Tiernan v. Sheldon,
191 So.2d 87 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966). Cf., Am. Mortgage & Safe Deposit Co. v. Rubin, 168
So.2d 777 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
24. C. & H. Contractors, Inc. v. McKee, 177 So.2d 851 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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When the third person seeks to hold the promoter personally liable
on the contract, it has been held consistently that, inasmuch as the promoter is not an agent of the corporation to be formed, he is liable unless
the party with whom he contracts has agreed to look to the corporation
rather than to him for satisfaction. Put another way, a person who acts
as an agent for a non-existent principal is himself regarded as a principal.
This concept was brought into sharp focus in the Florida case of Abel
v. Dooley, 5 where lessors who leased realty to a corporation without
knowledge that the corporation had not yet been incorporated were permitted to recover rent from the promoter after incorporation.2 6
D. Authority of Directorsand Officers
When P deals with ABC, Inc. through one of its officials, the question of whether the contract is binding upon ABC, Inc. may arise. In the
past, Florida has adhered to two basic tests on this point: (1) Is the
contract within the corporation's chartered powers? (2) Is the contract
entered into by an agent of the company who is properly authorized, or
has the contract been ratified by the company?2" These tests were applied
in a recent Florida case where, although the corporation could not issue
construction loans under its charter powers, it properly issued a mortgage
commitment to a contractor for proposed construction. The court held
that the vice president charged with the responsibility of procuring business for the corporation did have authority to promise the contractor
that the corporation would obtain a construction loan for him if he was
unable to do so.2"
E. Corporate Powers
Although the corporate code specifies that a corporation can be
organized "for any lawful purpose," other statutes may prohibit corporations from engaging in certain lines of endeavor, such as law, dentistry,
accounting and architecture.29 In Nicholson Supply Co. v. First Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n, 0 a complaint was filed by a plaintiff corporation
through its president, but the complaint was not signed by an attorney
25. 185 So.2d 491 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).

26. One eminent scholar has suggested that:
[Ilt seems more nearly to correspond with the intentions of the parties to suppose
that when the corporation assents to the contract, it assents to take the place of the
promoter-a change of parties to which the other side of the contract assented in

advance. There would then be a novation which could discharge the promoter at the
same time the corporation assumed the obligation.
I S. WlLISTON, CONTRACTS § 306 (1936).
27. See, e.g., Painter Fertilizer Co. v. Boyd, 93 Fla. 354, 114 So. 444 (1927).
28. Florida Capital Corp. v. Bissett Constr., Inc., 167 So.2d 595 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
29. See Note, Right of Corporation to Engage in Business, Trade or Activity Requiring
License from Public, 165 A.L.R. 1098 (1946). See also FLA. STAT. § 621 (1967) (Professional
Service Corporation, Act).
30. 184 So.2d 438 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966), noted in 21 U. MAm.i L. REv. 889 (1967).
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as required by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure in effect at the time
of the filing of the case. The court held that the complaint was a nullity,
on the ground that although an individual may represent himself in court
without the necessity of employing an attorney, a corporation may not
do so. The decision is in accord with an established line of authority.
The point is that a corporation cannot practice law and thus can appear
in court in its own behalf only through the agency of a natural person,
i.e., a licensed attorney.
Since the celebrated Jacksonville case3 it has been clear in Florida
that corporations have the implied power to do acts necessary or reasonably incidental to the performance of their authorized functions. Thus,
it was held in a recent Florida case that a corporation had the implied
power to enter into a managerial employment contract.3 The situation
was intensified, however, by the fact that the plaintiff-director had participated in setting his own compensation.3 But in view of the fact that
all interested persons participated in the drafting and execution of the
contract and had fully recognized it for a period of two years, the court
concluded that the contract was ratified and affirmed by the corporation.
F. Unlawful Transfers to Officers, Directors and Stockholders
It is axiomatic that a financially embarrassed corporation may not
lawfully transfer any of its property to its officers, directors or shareholders if such transfer would jeopardize the position of primary creditors. A Florida statute so provides.3 4 This statute has recently been the
subject of two significant interpretations.
In the first of these cases,3 5 plaintiff corporation conveyed certain
of its real property to a stockholder and former director. These conveyances were made at a time when the corporation was in straitened
financial circumstances. In a subsequent attempt to have the conveyances
set aside, the corporation relied primarily upon that portion of the aforementioned statute which reads:
No corporation which shall have refused to pay any of its notes
or obligations when due, shall transfer any of its property to any
of its officers, directors or stockholders, directly or indirectly,
for the payment of any debt, or upon any other consideration
than the full value of the property paid in cash. [Italics added]
In refuting this argument, the court stated: "There was no showing, however, that plaintiffs had absolutely refused to pay these debts. 'Refused'
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Jacksonville, M. P. Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Hooper, 160 U.S. 514 (1896).
Collins v. Collins Fruit Co., 189 So.2d 262 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
See Flight Equip. & Eng'r Corp. v. Shelton, 103 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1958).
FLA. STAT. § 608.55 (1967).
Venice East, Inc. v. Manno, 186 So.2d 71 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
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and 'failed' are not necessarily synonymous." The case is in accord with
the majority position on this point."6
In the second case involving Florida Statute section 608.55,11 a
corporation, while under an obligation to pay a bondholder, borrowed
further funds from a bank by means of a note. One of the endorsers of
the note was also an officer and director of the corporate borrower. Notwithstanding a demand by the bondholder and refusal by the corporation, it proceeded to pay its obligation on the note. The court held that
such payment at least indirectly benefited the officer and director by
discharging the note obligation, and that this rendered him individually
liable to the bondholder within the meaning of section 608.55.8 The
argument was advanced that recovery against an officer or director under
the statute is subject to proof of insolvency of the debtor corporation,
or that it was in danger of immediate insolvency, plus a preferential
treatment to the officer or director. In refuting this argument, the court
again relied heavily on statutory interpretation in New York, the state
of origin of the Florida statute. That construction has permitted recovery
after the corporate debtor "has refused to pay an obligation, by demonstrating that after such refusal the corporation either directly or
indirectly
39
benefited an officer or director by discharging an obligation.)
G. Shareholders' Actions
Actions by shareholders may take one of three forms: (1) individual
action; (2) derivative action; (3) representative or class action. The
shareholders' derivative action differs from the individual and the class
action in that the purpose of the derivative action is to obtain a judgment
in the corporation's favor. In other words, it is an action which the corporation itself would normally bring but for some reason does not, and
the shareholder undertakes to do so. On the other hand, individual and
class actions assert a cause of action against the corporation. A Florida
court recently had occasion to consider this difference in definition as a
decisive factor in its decision.4" The stockholder's complaint attacked the
directors' handling of corporate affairs. Thus, the court correctly held that
it was an attempt "to state a cause of action classically in the right of the
corporation. "' 4 ' Being a derivative action, it was governed by the Florida
36. Id. at 75. FLA. STAT. § 608.55 (1967) was patterned after § 15 of the New York
Stock Corporation Law. New York courts have placed a similar construction on this
language. See, e.g., Swan v. Stiles, 94 App. Div. 117, 87 N.Y.S. 1089 (1904).
37. Alberts v. Schneiderman, 182 So.2d 50 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
38. The last sentence of FLA. STAT. § 608.55 (1967) provides as follows:
The directors or officers of a corporation who shall violate . . . any provision of
this statute shall be personally liable to the creditors and stockholders of the corporation of which they shall be directors or officers to the full extent of any loss such
creditors and stockholders may respectively sustain by such violation.
39. Alberts v. Schneiderman, 182 So.2d 50, 52 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
40. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Peters, 175 So.2d 54 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
41. Id. at 56.
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"strike suit" statute, which requires the posting of security if the "plaintiff
or plaintiffs hold less than five percent of the outstanding shares ...

un-

less the stock held by such plaintiff or plaintiffs shall then have a fair
value in excess of fifty thousand dollars." 42 Inasmuch as plaintiff did not
qualify under either of these criteria, the court correctly required him to
post security before proceeding further in the cause.
Will a court of equity appoint a receiver upon the request of a minority shareholder? Generally speaking, such drastic action is taken only as
a last resort. In the past, Florida courts have held that unless the corporation is insolvent or unless actual fraud upon the rights of the minority
shareholder (or creditor), which may reasonably spell imminent danger
of loss of corporate assets and seriously threaten corporate existence, is
clearly shown, a receiver should not be appointed. 3 This view was followed in a recent Florida case where no such factors were present except
as alleged in unsworn allegations of a minority shareholder's complaint."
42. FLA. STAT. § 608.131(4) (1967).

43. See McAllister Hotel, Inc. v. Schatzberg, 40 So.2d 201, 203 (Fla. 1949).
44. Conlee Constr. Co. v. Krause, 192 So.2d 330 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).

